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Michael J. Meurer∗ and Katherine J. Strandburg
The authors develop an informal model of the impact of the nonobviousness
standard on the choice of research projects. Previous models assume that the
basic question confronting a researcher is, “Shall I produce this particular
invention?” More realistically, the authors think a researcher asks, “Which
research path shall I pursue?” The model shows that a patent serves as a
carrot to induce the choice of more difficult projects than would be pursued
under the no-patent alternative. The nonobviousness standard serves as a
stick to prod researchers to choose even more difficult projects. The results of
the model help us understand why a fact-intensive issue like obviousness is a
question of law. The model also helps us understand the optimal
relationship between the nonobviousness standard and patentable subjectmatter exclusions. Commentators often suggest subject-matter exclusions are
unnecessary if the nonobviousness standard is used appropriately. The
authors’ model suggests this intuition is wrong for inventions characterized
by large social spillovers and high social costs of patenting; a simple subjectmatter exclusion would be more efficient.
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INTRODUCTION

The question of obviousness is central to determining patentability,
yet what it means for an invention to be obvious in light of relevant prior
art is one of the most difficult puzzles in patent law. The Supreme
1
Court’s recent decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.
overturned the Federal Circuit’s rigid reliance on the “teaching,
suggestion, motivation” test for obviousness. In KSR the Court reaffirmed
the general framework laid out in the Supreme Court’s seminal Graham
2
v. John Deere Co. opinion in which nonobviousness is a question of law to
be evaluated in light of underlying factual inquiries related to the context
in which invention occurred. Importantly, KSR clarified that obviousness
must be assessed in light of a context of normal baseline innovation in a
3
particular technical field and assuming a level of ordinary creativity.
The KSR decision clears the way for new thinking about the
obviousness issue, which, despite its importance, is surprisingly undertheorized. Most scholarly discussions are very informal, simply listing the
tradeoffs involved in setting the level of inventive step required for
4
patentability. For the most part, the decision whether to make a

1

127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966).
3
127 S. Ct. at 1741–42, 1746.
4
For earlier scholarly commentary on obviousness see, e.g., Margo A. Bagley,
Internet Business Model Patents: Obvious by Analogy, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
253 (2001); John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475 (2003); Rebecca
Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success
and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV.
805 (1988) [hereinafter Merges, Commercial Success]; John F. Duffy,
Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2007); Edmund
W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere: New Standards for Patents, 1966
SUP. CT. REV. 293; R. Polk Wagner and Katherine J. Strandburg, Debate, The
Obviousness Requirement in the Patent Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 96 (2006), available at
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/obviousness/Wagner_Strandburg_Debate.pdf
. For more formal models see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 363 (2000); Robert P Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of
Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L. J. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Merges, Uncertainty]. For
empirical studies see Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an
Evidentiary Lens: The “Suggestion Test” as a Rule of Evidence, 2006 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1517
(2006) [hereinafter Cotropia, Patent Law]; Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness
and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
911 (2007); Sean M. McEldowney, New Insights on the “Death” of Obviousness: An
Empirical Study of District Court Obviousness Opinions, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4; Lee
Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical
Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051 (2007); Gregory Mandel,
Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court
in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1 (Fall, 2006–2007); Gregory N. Mandel,
Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent
Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006). See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
2

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150741
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particular invention is conceptualized as an isolated yes or no choice
depending simply on whether inventive costs exceed benefits captured by
the inventor. We introduce a model of the nonobviousness threshold
that reflects a somewhat more realistic view. In our model, we assume
that research projects are selected by a research manager, who evaluates
the potential payoff of various approaches to a particular objective. Thus,
we assume that the basic question confronting a researcher is not “Shall I
produce this invention?”, but rather “Which research path shall I
pursue?”
In this Symposium Article, we explore three insights which arise
from considering a simple version of our model in which a research
manager chooses from among various independent research approaches
to a particular objective. While patent protection serves as a “carrot” to
induce greater technological advance, the nonobviousness threshold can
serve as a “stick” to induce more ambitious, socially optimal research
projects than would otherwise be pursued.
We argue first that a nonobviousness threshold serves at least two
important purposes: Along traditional lines, our patenting model
provides an incentive to pursue more costly inventions by allowing
inventors to appropriate more of the value of their inventions. A
nonobviousness threshold ensures that patents do not encumber
5
technologies for which non-patent-based incentives are sufficient. Over
and above this traditional justification, our model suggests that the
nonobviousness requirement serves another very important purpose
where, as is realistically nearly always the case, the social value of research
projects substantially exceeds their private value. When this is the case,
the socially preferable level of invention exceeds the privately optimal
choice even when patents are available at both levels. The nonobviousness
threshold may be used as a “stick” to induce researchers to pursue more
difficult, socially preferred research projects.
Second, the model aids in understanding why and in what sense
obviousness must be deemed a question of law. In Graham, the Supreme
6
Court held that “the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law,”
which, as it pertains to obviousness, “lends itself to several basic factual
7
inquiries.” The Court thus established obviousness as a question of law to
POLICY (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf;
STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (2004). See generally Symposium, Nonobviousness—The Shape of Things to Come,
12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 323 (2008).
5
See, e.g., KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1746 (“And as progress beginning from higher levels
of achievement is expected in the normal course, the results of ordinary innovation
are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise
patents might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts”). Merges,
Uncertainty supra note 4; Lunney, supra note 4; Wagner and Strandburg, supra note 4
(Strandburg argument).
6
Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (1966).
7
Id.
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be resolved in light of specific factual predicates, a standard reiterated by
8
the Federal Circuit repeatedly since its inception. Nonetheless, it is far
from clear what it means for obviousness to be a “question of law,”
particularly in light of its highly technical nature. Our model suggests an
interpretation of the nonobviousness requirement as highly policydependent and intertwined with the social value (as well as the technical
difficulty) of an inventive project. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s
division of the issue between questions of fact regarding the technical
context of invention and an ultimate legal determination of whether the
inventive step is sufficient to warrant a patent, this interpretation helps us
to understand the appropriate division of labor between courts,
factfinders, and the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
Third, our model sheds some light on the need for patentable
subject matter restrictions. In some cases, the social costs of patenting
may be sufficiently high that the social benefit of the greater
technological step that can be induced by patenting’s carrots and sticks is
not enough to offset the social cost of patent protection. Our model
suggests that while advocates of patent protection for “anything under
9
the sun that is made by man” are correct that patents will induce greater
inventive steps, they are incorrect in assuming that this is always socially
preferable. Society may be better off with a less ambitious series of
inventive steps which contribute unpatented technology which is more
widely and cheaply available.
In Part II of the Article, we introduce our model and discuss its
assumptions and limitations. We also compare our model to some earlier
treatments of the obviousness question. In Part III, we explain how our
model leads to a “carrots and sticks” view of the nonobviousness
requirement and lay out (but do not explore in detail here) some of the
considerations that would come into a practical application of this view of
nonobviousness. In Part IV, we explain why our model contributes to
understanding what it should mean for obviousness to be treated as a
question of law. In Part V, we discuss how the social costs of patent
protection play into the question of whether some types of inventions
should be denied patent protection categorically, rather than evaluated
for sufficient technical advance. The model helps to explain why a
heightened nonobviousness standard is not necessarily an acceptable
alternative to a doctrine of patentable subject matter. Part VI concludes
by summarizing and briefly describing some limitations of the model.
Elsewhere, we consider extensions of the model to address these
8

A Lexis search for (“question of law” /s (obvious! or nonobvious!)) yields 169
Federal Circuit cases spanning from November 23, 1983 to the present day (last
performed Apr. 16, 2008).
9
See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 946 (1999) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6
(1952))). See also, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and
Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV 55 (2003).
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limitations and explore the implications of the model for nonobviousness
10
doctrine in more detail.
II. A MODEL OF RESEARCH AND NONOBVIOUSNESS

We start this Article with a model of research, patenting, and the
nonobviousness requirement. The model takes an ex ante perspective,
asking how a research manager would go about choosing from a number
of different projects aimed in a particular technological direction. Our
model yields several insights into how patent policy affects an innovator’s
choice of research projects. First, the grant of a patent, even when there
is no test of obviousness, serves as a “carrot” that induces firms to choose
more difficult research projects than they would choose in the absence of
a possible patent. Second, the patent carrot may be insufficient to induce
the choice of the socially optimal research project, and the
nonobviousness standard can be used as a “stick” to push firms to
undertake more difficult research projects. Third, the rigor of the
nonobviousness standard is limited by the reality that firms must prefer
patenting to not patenting. If pursuing a nonobvious research project is
too costly, then firms will simply opt out of patenting and pursue less
costly projects. When the social cost of a patent is too high, then the best
policy is to prohibit patenting and let non-patent-based private incentives
guide the choice of research project.
A. Introduction to the Model

Our model assumes a research entity with a particular general
objective. Ex ante, there may be several possible research projects aimed
at that objective. To be concrete, let us consider a stylized story of the
11
invention of the incandescent light bulb. Specifically, suppose in 1878 a
potential inventor had a general goal of inventing a better filament that
would improve the quality of existing light bulbs and possibly make them
commercially feasible. We can sketch a range of possible research
12
projects that the potential inventor could choose from. He might work
with platinum filaments. Platinum worked in earlier light bulbs but it was
expensive and has a relatively low melting point. The potential inventor
might experiment with different structures of platinum filaments, or
develop a combination of platinum filaments and powdered charcoal. He
might instead try to improve the carbonized paper filaments that had
met with some earlier success. He might try tungsten or some other metal
10

MICHAEL J. MEURER AND KATHERINE J. STRANDBURG, NONOBVIOUSNESS AND NERD
CULTURE (work in progress).
11
See The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895) for one part of the
light bulb filament story.
12
See, e.g., The Edison Papers, Electric Lamp, http://edison.rutgers.edu/
lamp.htm, for a description of the history of the development of incandescent light
bulbs and filaments.
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or alloy for the filament. Or he might follow the path of Thomas Edison
13
and experiment with plant fibers and other carbon-based filaments. In
this simplest version of our model, we assume that our research entity
selects a single project and that sufficient funds may be borrowed to
perform the research so that there is no budget constraint. Thus the
research entity in our model will select the research project that, when
viewed ex ante, maximizes its private expected return. In other words, the
firm bases its planning on the ex ante expected costs and benefits of a
given research path.
We define y as the technical difficulty of the research project (or,
alternatively, we order all potential projects by technical difficulty). In
our model, we thus suppose that the projects that a researcher would
consider to attack a particular objective can be ordered and arrayed
along a horizontal axis as in Figure 1. To return to our light bulb
filament example, we assume that conventional wisdom in 1878 could be
used to order the potential projects in terms of difficulty. Perhaps the
tungsten filament project (which met success about twenty years later)
would be furthest to the right. Perhaps the carbonized paper filament
project would be furthest to the left. The others would be somewhere in
between. We believe that this ordering is generally feasible. In other
words, if asked, people having ordinary skill in the art tend to agree on
whether a particular research project is difficult or easy. They tend to
agree on whether a particular project is likely to be cheap or costly,
humdrum or exciting. Most importantly, we argue that this ex ante
assessment of technical difficulty is what should be relevant for assessing
14
obviousness. In our filament example, patent law should not ask
whether a carbonized bamboo fiber is an obvious filament invention ex
post. Rather, the law should take an ex ante perspective and ask whether a
well managed research project investigating plant fibers as filaments
would be easy or difficult (likely or unlikely to succeed). This perspective
helps diminish the hindsight bias that might have occurred if Edison had
been lucky and stumbled on his favored bamboo fiber in one of his first
15
tests.
13

Edison held numerous patents on light bulb filaments. See The Edison Papers,
Edison’s Patents, http://edison.rutgers.edu/patents.htm, for a list of all of Edison’s
patents.
14
We do not frame the obviousness inquiry in terms of the particular research
path followed by an inventor ex post. When we speak about the inventor’s project, we
are speaking about the objective of the research rather than its eventual path. For
example, we suppose that Edison’s objective was to find an improved carbon-based
filament, or perhaps to find a plant fiber that worked as an improved filament. Thus,
our modeling approach is consistent with patent law. Patent law insists that
obviousness is judged objectively from the perspective of the person having ordinary
skill in the art (PHOSITA). Our standard focuses on the difficulty of the path or
paths that PHOSITA might take to complete the inventor’s research project.
15
Cf. Merges, Uncertainty, supra note 4, at, 38–39 (lucky inventions often occur in
the context of a costly research project and they should not be categorically excluded
from patent protection).
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Given a particular research path, y, we denote the expected cost of a
project c(y). The expected private value of the research depends on
whether the firm gets a patent after successfully completing the project,
among other things. We denote the expected private value of y when the
firm does not expect to get a patent on the technical improvement
resulting from the research project y as v(y), and the expected private
value when a firm expects a patent to be available as V(y). Because the
success of a particular research project is at least somewhat uncertain,
both v(y) and V(y) are discounted by the probability of success. The
expected profit from the project y is thus v(y) – c(y) without a patent and
V(y ) – c(y) with a patent. At present, we assume that each research project
leads to a different technical result. Thus, in the example of the light
bulb filaments, one project leads to a platinum filament, one to a
carbonized paper filament, and so forth. It is natural to assume that
16
expected cost and expected private value increase as y increases. While
it might turn out, for example, that a brilliant scientist has an insight that
solves a technically difficult problem in one afternoon or that a
technically “easy” approach requires very expensive, but routine
experimentation, we think that, for a given technical objective, costs
expected ex ante will ordinarily increase with technical difficulty, as
illustrated in Figure 1. The assumption that the expected value of a
research project increases with technical difficulty may not always be
correct in fact, but we think that it is sufficiently embedded in the
justification for a patent system that is intended to encourage technical
progress to be justified for our purposes. Alternatively, we can justify the
assumption of increasing benefit by assuming that research entities
themselves will screen out projects that are of great difficulty and little
value so that we need not consider them in our model.

16
It is probably possible to imagine situations in which these plausible
assumptions would not hold. We exclude such exceptional and, we think, rare
situations from our analysis.
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Figure 1 thus displays plausible expected cost and expected private value
curves for an inventive firm. In this Article, we mostly assume that y is a
continuous variable—i.e., that there is a continuum of increasingly difficult
projects. In some cases, it will be more appropriate to think of y as an ordinal
variable, ordering projects by technical difficulty. We do not believe this
distinction is of great significance for our primary results and conclusions,
but we recognize that it may have some consequences and will consider them
in our more detailed treatment. Though there is no quantitative scale for
technical difficulty, we believe that there is an intuitive scale of difficulty
approximately shared by PHOSITA in a given field and that on this intuitive
scale, marginal costs tend to increase with technical difficulty as depicted in
17
Figure 1. The curvature of the value curve shown in the figure reflects the
expectation that there are decreasing returns to technological improvement.
We also assume that the expected private value of an invention is increased
by patenting and thus that v(y) < V(y). There are undoubtedly situations in
which this is not the case—a researcher who expects to be able to exploit an
invention secretly for longer than the patent term might well expect private
value to be decreased by patenting. In such situations, the nonobviousness
threshold is irrelevant, since researchers will eschew patent protection. We
thus set these situations aside for the present analysis.

17
Alternatively, and without loss of generality here, we could scale the horizontal
axis to cost and draw a linear cost curve. The linear cost curve assumption breaks
down if we want to compare different cost curves for the same set of research
projects—for example if we want to model different classes of potential inventors. We
do this in our more detailed treatment, but it is not necessary for the present Article.
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Given the private costs and benefits of available projects, as illustrated in
Figure 1, one can determine the optimal choice of research project by
maximizing net private return. If the firm does not plan to patent (or if no
patent is available), then the project that maximizes expected profit is yn. If
the firm does plan to patent, then the profit-maximizing project is yp. These
choices maximize the difference between expected private value and
18
expected cost. Because a patent increases private returns from each given
invention, the optimal project if a patent is available (denoted yp in Figure 1)
is at a higher level of technical difficulty than the optimal project if no patent
is available (denoted yn in Figure 1), as illustrated by the fact that yp is to the
right of yn in the figure. This observation is consistent with the general idea
that a patent provides an “incentive” for invention, but it is a somewhat more
subtle interpretation than the simple idea that a patent allows an inventor to
recoup her investments in inventive activity.
In Parts III, IV, and V, we will build upon this basic model to address the
issues of the function of the nonobviousness threshold, the reasons for
treating nonobviousness as a question of law, and the need for a patentable
subject matter restriction. Before doing so, we pause to compare the model
we have just introduced with earlier attempts to model the nonobviousness
issue.
B. Comparison of the Model to the Previous Literature
Even though most commentators identify the nonobviousness doctrine
as the most important standard for obtaining a patent, there is surprisingly
19
little formal analysis of the standard by either lawyers or economists. Most
discussions of the issue revolve around attempting to distinguish those
inventions that would have been made even without the patent incentive—
because first-mover advantages and other non-patent rewards for invention
18
See Merges, Commercial Success, supra note 4, at 852 (drawing lessons from the
work of Nelson and Winter: firms emphasize business factors including expected cost
and value and not just technical difficulty when they invest in R&D); Merges,
Uncertainty, supra note 4, at 10–11 (the prospect of getting a patent likely affects
research project choice).
19
See references cited, supra note 4, for earlier commentary on the issue of
nonobviousness. Some of the work on cumulative innovation by economists also can
be applied to the nonobviousness requirement. Robert Hunt has done this explicitly.
He shows that weakening the nonobviousness requirement raises the expected value
of patenting and provides an incentive to firms to do more research, but it also
increases patenting by others. The patenting of others will hurt the research incentive
of pioneers when subsequent patents cover improvements of or complements to the
technology covered by the pioneer’s patent. See Robert M. Hunt, Nonobviousness and
the Incentive to Innovate: An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Reform 38 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 99-3, 1999), available at
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/files/wps/1999/wp99-3.pdf (showing “that weaker
nonobviousness requirements can lead to less R&D activity, and this is more likely to
occur in industries that rapidly innovate”); Robert M. Hunt, Patentability, Industry
Structure, and Innovation, 52 J. INDUS. ECON. 401, 402 (2004). We will discuss
cumulative innovation in our longer article, Nonobviousness and Nerd Culture, supra
note 10.

LCB_12_2_ART10_STRANDBURG.DOC

556

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

5/22/2008 4:30:04 PM

[Vol. 12:2

provide sufficient excess returns to cover inventive costs—from those that
20
need a patent to garner sufficient returns. The question is usually framed in
terms of whether it is possible for an inventor to recoup her investments in
invention without a patent or whether a patent is required to make a profit.
From this dichotomous perspective, commentators often argue that an
21
optimal choice of patentability standard should minimize error costs. One
type of error, called a false positive, occurs when the patent incentive is not
needed to induce the invention, yet a patent is granted. In such cases, society
needlessly bears the cost of a patent. The other sort of error, called a false
negative, occurs when a patent is not available for an inventive project that
will not be profitable without the additional private return which patent
exclusivity would provide. Under these analyses, a more rigorous obviousness
standard increases false negatives and reduces false positives. An optimal
policy finds the right balance. Though this approach is useful in advancing
our general understanding of alternative means for inventors to recoup
inventive investments, the “on/off” picture of invention is unrealistic and has
so far been unsuccessful in leading to doctrinal tools for setting the
nonobviousness threshold.
Our model differs from these informal discussions of the law and
economics of obviousness by assuming that research managers choose
among possible research projects of varying technical difficulty rather than
making a simple yes or no choice—conduct research or not in pursuit of a
particular invention. In the analysis that follows here and in our more
detailed article, we consider how those research manager choices relate to
socially preferable research choices.
Two earlier approaches to the nonobviousness issue bear a closer
relationship to ours and it is worth describing them in a bit more detail here
for purposes of comparison. Professor Robert Merges has proposed and
analyzed a model which, like ours, is inspired by the conception of a research
22
manager determining how to invest in research and development. Like our
model, Merges’s model goes beyond a simple dichotomous choice to invent
or not invent based on whether a positive net private return is expected ex
ante. He presents a two-stage model featuring a decision to conduct research
in stage one and a decision to develop the resulting technology in stage
23
24
two. In Merges’s model, uncertainty plays the primary role. The first stage
of research reduces the uncertainty associated with the decision to pursue
the second stage of development. Merges uses his model to argue that,
because of the important role played by uncertainty, adjustments of the
obviousness standard are not likely to change the expected value of a
25
research project significantly. Nonetheless, Merges emphasizes, like we do,
20

See, e.g., Merges, Uncertainty, supra note 4, at 29–31; Kitch, supra note 4, at 301.
See, e.g., Cotropia, Patent Law, supra note 4, at 1563–67.
22
See generally Merges, Uncertainty, supra note 4 (analyzing the effect of
nonobviousness on business judgments by R&D managers).
23
Id. at 21–23.
24
Id. at 23–26, 31.
25
Id. at 25–26.
21

LCB_12_2_ART10_STRANDBURG.DOC

2008]

PATENT CARROTS AND STICKS

5/22/2008 4:30:04 PM

557

that the obviousness standard is still important to give the right incentives to
26
guide investment of the marginal research dollar. He argues that the
probability of technical success should be the key to implementing the
nonobviousness requirement, both because it is so important for
determining whether a project will be undertaken and because it is a
27
relatively feasible standard to implement. Research projects that are
sufficiently likely to succeed should not yield patents because such projects
are likely to go forward without the prospect of a patent. By denying patents
in such cases, society avoids the social costs patents impose. In contrast,
uncertain projects, especially when the cost of research is high, should satisfy
the obviousness standard because the patent incentive is probably needed as
28
an incentive to invent.
Merges’s model incorporates a more sophisticated view of the way in
which a given research project progresses than is featured either in more
informal discussions of obviousness or in our model, which does not break
the research project down into stages (though it does account for the overall
uncertainty of a research project). Despite its sophistication, however,
29
Merges’s model retains the focus on a single, given, research project. Our
model broadens the view of the function of the obviousness requirement to
include its possible influence on the choice of various possible research
directions.
Though lacking the detailed treatment of uncertainty reduction that is
present in Merges’s model, our model incorporates uncertainty to some
degree by focusing on expected costs and benefits. We assume that inventive
costs rise for projects of great technical difficulty. This rise is attributable in
30
significant part to the increased uncertainty of such projects.
Professor Glynn Lunney has proposed an approach to nonobviousness
which is similar to ours in that it compares incentives to invest in various
31
possible projects. Where our model focuses on a research manager’s choice
among research projects, Lunney’s analysis focuses on the choice between
32
inventive and non-inventive investments. He argues that what he terms the
“creative investment fraction” affects the availability of innovation rents
(based on first-mover advantages and so forth) where patent protection is
26

Id.
Id. at 2–3, 29–32, 35–37 (uncertainty based theory of nonobviousness).
28
Id. at 41–55 (favoring patents when there is high variance of research cost
coupled with risk aversion).
29
Id. at 19–20. Merges does note in passing the potential for a patenting
threshold based on riskiness of research to displace lower-risk research, id. at 20–21,
but the selection between research projects is not a focus of his analysis.
30
Merges also discusses the implications of risk aversion, particularly for high
cost research projects. Id. at 43–55. Our model does not deal with risk aversion
explicitly, but our assumption that there are diminishing marginal returns to
inventors as technical step increases is consistent with risk aversion (though
motivated more by an assumption that technical improvements generally do produce
diminishing marginal improvements in the social and private value of inventions).
31
Lunney, supra note 4.
32
Id. at 404–12.
27
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33

unavailable. The “creative investment fraction” is the fraction of the overall
investment in a project which is spent on presumably easy-to-copy invention,
as opposed to things like materials and capital equipment. The “creative
investment fraction” thus reflects the degree to which a second-comer can
34
produce a product more cheaply than the inventor. In other words, it is a
measure of the extent of possible free riding. Lunney advocates setting a
35
threshold of creative investment fraction for awarding a patent.
A key insight of Lunney’s article is that the nonobviousness threshold
may be used to shift investment between projects. Lunney argues that free
riding can decrease the private rents available from high-creativity projects,
thus drawing investment to lower-creativity projects even if the high-creativity
projects have higher social value. The nonobviousness threshold is used in
his proposal to award patents on high-creativity projects so as to deter free
riding and shift investment toward those projects.
Our model assumes a research manager who chooses only among
creative projects. However, the creative investment fraction for a given
research project is reflected in our model in the ratio between V(y) and v(y).
A project with a high creative investment fraction (and corresponding high
potential for free riding) will have a high ratio of V(y)/v(y). Conversely, a
project with a low creative investment fraction (and correspondingly greater
first mover advantage) will have a ratio of V(y)/v(y) closer to one. If, for
example, we were to assume that the costs of producing light bulbs are
relatively insensitive to the choice of filament material, then a graph like
Figure 1 for the light bulb project would show an increasing proportional
separation between V(y) and v(y) as y increased. The result of such an
increasing “creative investment fraction” would be reflected in our model in
a larger separation between yn and yp.
As discussed in the next Part, our model departs from both Lunney’s
and Merges’s in the way it accounts for the social value of invention. Our
model suggests that neither a fixed threshold based on creative investment
fraction nor a fixed uncertainty threshold sufficiently accounts for the
divergence between socially and privately optimal choice of research
projects.
III. THE CARROT AND STICK OF THE NONOBVIOUSNESS
THRESHOLD
A. The Patent Carrot
Up to this point, we have said nothing about the role of the
nonobviousness threshold in motivating the choice of research project in our
model. Figure 1 shows how patenting provides a carrot to induce researchers
to pursue more difficult projects, but a nonobviousness threshold apparently
is not needed to induce this higher level of activity. To understand the role
33
34
35

Id. at 413–15.
Id.
Id. at 415–18.
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of the nonobviousness requirement, we must consider the social welfare
implications of the project choices researchers make. What is the
relationship between the privately optimal research project and the socially
preferable choice? To answer this question, we must consider the likely
relationship between private and social value of the research. Figure 2
illustrates a highly stylized situation in which a patent provides perfect
appropriation of the value of the invention. In that case, the expected social
value of project y, which we denote W(y), equals the expected private
value with a patent, V(y). We also assume in Figure 2 that the
social and private costs are equal. In the simple case depicted in
Figure 2 the socially optimal project, which we call y*, would match the
privately optimal project when the inventor pursues a patent, yp.

Figure 2
V, v
W, c

V(y) = W(y)

c(y)
v(y)

yn

yp = y*

yn
y

Meurer Strandburg
Nonobviousness and Nerd Culture

Figure 2 provides a helpful benchmark that we use to make three
preliminary points. First, there is a socially optimal level of technical
improvement. More is not always better. Society could get positive expected
returns from any project up to y*, but it would be socially wasteful to push for
difficult projects to the right of y*, because the cost of those projects rises
more quickly than the benefit. Thus, the goal of patent law (and the
nonobviousness requirement more specifically) should not be to encourage
greater levels of invention per se, but to encourage the socially preferable
level of invention. In Figure 2, the socially preferable level is the same as the
privately preferable level because we assume that the patentee captures all
the benefits of the invention. Realistically, the expected social and private
values are likely to diverge. They coincide only if the inventor captures all the
value of the invention, and if the patent does not impose any social cost in
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excess of the costs invested directly in research and development. As we
discuss in greater detail later, most of the time, the socially optimal research
project will be more ambitious than the private optimum because of
spillovers in value, but sometimes it may be lower than the private optimum
in the presence of patenting because of the social costs patenting imposes.
Second, the optimal choice of a nonobviousness standard is inextricably
linked to spillovers and patenting costs. When the assumptions underlying
Figure 2 hold true, there is no need for a nonobviousness requirement and
patenting would always be optimal because private parties would choose the
socially (and privately) optimal level of invention even if patents were
available at lesser levels of technical improvement. Third, our model reminds
us that the frequent crude assumption that an invention will be pursued as
long as private benefits outweigh private costs is unlikely to pertain to
realistic inventive scenarios where researchers seek to maximize net returns.
B. The Nonobviousness Stick
In this Section, we relax the assumption of no spillovers illustrated in
Figure 2. We then explain why spillovers create a role for a nonobviousness
standard. Figure 3 displays a setting in which the expected social benefit
generally exceeds the expected private benefit of a research project, i.e., W(y)
> V(y). For simplicity of analysis, we interpret W(y) to represent the net social
benefit over and above the direct costs of the research project (which we
have previously denoted c(y) rather than displaying a separate social cost
36
37
curve. Private and social benefits generally diverge for several reasons.
Probably the two most important are (1) that a patent owner does not
38
capture all the value enjoyed by users of his or her invention, and (2) that
disclosure of an invention, including the disclosure in the patent, helps
39
others develop subsequent inventions.

36

This assumption is important in interpreting our later graphs, in which we
allow the possibility that social value depends on whether the invention is patented.
37
For a discussion of the ubiquity and importance of spillovers of intellectual
property, see Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
257 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031 (2005). See also JAMES BESSEN AND MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (Princeton University
Press 2008) (discussing why patents fail to work effectively as property rights).
38
Consumer surplus is the term economists apply to the value enjoyed by
consumers. Normally, patentees lack the information and the market power required
to extract all consumer surplus. For a discussion of price discrimination and
consumer surplus extraction by patent holders, see generally Jerry A. Hausman &
Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Price Discrimination and Patent Policy, 19 RAND J. Econ. 253
(1988); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001).
39
Patent rights are limited in important ways so that subsequent improvers can
earn rents from their improvements, and thus, they have an incentive to pursue
improvement innovations. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); SUZANNE SCOTCHMER,
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Normally, the divergence of social and private value implies the
divergence of the socially optimal project from the privately optimal project.
Figure 3 shows that, at least for cost and benefit curves of the generally
40
reasonable shape depicted, the technical advance corresponding to the
*
socially optimal project, y , exceeds that of the privately optimal project, yp,
even when the inventor pursues a patent. Intuitively, a social planner wants
to push for a more difficult project because the marginal social gains at yp are
large enough to more than offset the marginal cost of a project at level yp
even though the marginal private gains are not. The divergence between yp
and y* is due to the assumption, reflected in Figure 3, that the greater the
technical advance, the more the social value associated with that advance
exceeds the private value. This assumption reflects the reasonable notion
that bigger inventive steps are likely to lead to more extensive and broader
opportunities for follow-on innovation and, in particular, that they are more
likely to lead to a broader and more extensive set of improvements that will
not be made by the original inventor.
One new insight from our model is that it is to a great extent because of
this gap between privately and socially optimal invention levels that a
nonobviousness threshold is desirable. The obviousness standard can be used
as a stick to prod an inventive entity to choose a more difficult research
project than is privately optimal. We let O represent the threshold level of
difficulty that must be met or surpassed before a firm can get a patent. If O is
set at any value less than or equal to yp, then it is not binding, in the sense
that it does not push the research entity to choose a more difficult project
than it would otherwise choose. On the other hand, if O is greater than yp, it
is binding in the sense that if an inventive entity wants a patent, it must
choose a project that is more difficult than it would have chosen in a regime
with no obviousness standard (or a lax standard).

INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004) (discussing the ways in which patent law balances
incentives for original and follow-on inventors).
40
It is possible to imagine scenarios in which social and private value are not
related as depicted here. For example, private and social values could approach one
another in such a way that the socially optimum research project is less of an
inventive step than the privately optimal step. Depending on the specifics, it may be
optimal in such cases to refrain from patenting altogether. We address this question
in more detail in our longer article, but for now we simply state that we believe that in
most cases social spillovers will increase with the size of the technological advance.
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Figure 3
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Meurer Strandburg
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In Figure 3, the socially optimal choice of O simply equals the value of y
that maximizes the difference between expected social value and cost, y*.
Figure 3 thus illustrates how patents can function as both a “carrot” and a
“stick” in stimulating invention. Patents virtually always act as a carrot to
stimulate the choice of more difficult research projects. Even without an
obviousness test, a patent creates an incentive that induces the firm to
choose yp rather than yn. The nonobviousness requirement, however, can
provide a stick to push inventors to choose even more ambitious, socially
preferable projects. Thus, Figure 3 shows that the effect of a patent system
with an obviousness standard of O can be decomposed into a carrot effect
and a stick effect. The sum of these two effects raises the choice of research
project from yn to y*.
The view of the nonobviousness threshold suggested by our model is
significantly different from the perspective suggested by the usual discussion
based on the “on/off” view. The usual discussion has two parts: First, it
assumes that inventions are produced as long as they produce a net profit for
the inventor. In terms of our model this would mean that inventions are
produced without the patent incentive as long as v(y) – c(y) > 0. Second, it
posits that the purpose of the nonobviousness threshold is to avoid awarding
patents to inventions that would be produced even without the patent
incentive. If we consider this simplistic view in the context of Figure 3, we see
that it leads to a contradictory analysis. The assumption that projects are
pursued as long as there is a nonzero net return would suggest setting the
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obviousness threshold quite high—at the point where v(y) and c(y) cross.
Importantly, this point is above the socially optimal value of y. Moreover, our
model suggests that if the obviousness threshold were in fact set that high,
rather than choosing to pursue such a large inventive step our research
manager would choose the privately optimal project, yn. Thus, a
nonobviousness threshold set at the point where v(y) – c(y) = 0 would
backfire, leaving us without the benefits of the patent incentive carrot. On
the other hand, if we take the second part of the usual analysis seriously—
that the nonobviousness threshold should be set just so as to avoid patenting
those inventions that would be produced without a patent incentive—the
implication would seem to be that we should set the nonobviousness
threshold at yn. A nonobviousness threshold at yn, however, would fail to
provide a “stick” to push our researcher toward the socially preferred choice.
Indeed, setting the nonobviousness threshold at yn has no impact on the
research manager’s choice to pursue the yp research project. Our model
provides a more reasonable understanding of where the nonobviousness
threshold should be set.
Figure 3 also illustrates another of the misleading aspects of the crude
“on/off” view of the incentive effects of patenting. If the nonobviousness
threshold is mistakenly set too high, the result is not that invention is
foregone, but that non-optimal and inefficiently difficult projects will have to
be undertaken to obtain a patent. This is a social cost, of course, but not the
cost that (and probably not as great a cost as) the simpler perspective
suggests.
While it is desirable to set the nonobviousness threshold at the social
optimum, even a perfectly informed social planner faces a constraint when
using the obviousness standard as a stick. Prospective inventors will choose
not to pursue patentable projects if the nonobviousness threshold is set so
high that it is privately preferable to pursue a lower-tech unpatentable
project. We will call this the patenting constraint. The obviousness standard
can be used to prod an inventor to choose the socially optimal research
project only as long as that research project is at least as profitable (given a
patent) as the profit available from the research project, yn, that the inventor
would choose in the absence of a patent. As a policy matter, this means that
in some cases involving relatively large social spillovers, other mechanisms
(such as direct government funding of research) may be needed to obtain
the socially optimal level of research.
In Figure 3, the patenting constraint does not impede full use of the
obviousness standard as a stick. By inspection one can see that the private
profit available with a patent at y* exceeds the private profit available without
a patent at yn. Thus O can be set at the socially optimal level, y*, that
maximizes W(y) – c(y). The patenting constraint binds in the example
displayed in Figure 4, however. In Figure 4, the obviousness standard O
should be less than y* because the profit at y* is too small to induce a research
manager to pursue a patentable invention. The vertical distance AB
measures the maximum expected profit if the firm chooses not to patent.
That distance is larger than GH, the expected profit given a patent and the
choice of y = y*. One can see from Figure 4 that the patenting constraint is
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likely to be important when the social benefit from an invention is
considerably greater than the private benefit captured by patenting, so that y*
greatly exceeds yp.

Figure 4
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Even when the patenting constraint binds, as in Figure 4, the
obviousness standard can still be used as a stick to prod an inventive entity to
choose a more difficult project than it would otherwise choose. The socially
optimal choice of O in such a case, illustrated in Figure 4, is that value of y at
41
which the expected profit, measured by DE, equals the expected profit, AB,
which an inventor expects to receive by pursuing the privately optimal
unpatentable project at yn. Though social welfare would be increased even
more by a project of difficulty y*, the patent system cannot induce
investment in a project at that level.
The patenting constraint has the following policy relevance: If the
constraint binds tightly, then the obviousness standard cannot be used to
push up the difficulty of research projects very much. In such cases, a
rigorous obviousness standard can be counterproductive. If it is mistakenly
set too high, then inventive entities will forego pursuing patentable
inventions and the project difficulty will fall to yn. The risk of this error is apt
to grow as the patenting constraint binds more tightly.

41

There is no harm in assuming that the firm will choose to patent when
patenting and not patenting are equally profitable.
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To summarize, our model gives us the following advice as to where the
nonobviousness threshold should be set: if possible, set O at the socially
optimal technical level, y*. If the patenting constraint binds, set O at the
highest feasible technical level, as illustrated in Figure 4. Of course, this
result does not give us a recipe for assessing obviousness in the real world,
where we do not know how to draw the curves shown in Figures 3 and 4.
What it does is help us to understand the goal of the nonobviousness
requirement and give us an idea of the factors we should consider in
constructing a practical approach to the nonobviousness question. It is, for
example, important to understand how research costs rise as the technical
approaches to a particular objective increase in difficulty. Many of the factual
42
43
inquiries laid out by the Supreme Court in Graham and KSR —such as the
inquiry into the level of ordinary skill in the art and the secondary
consideration of “long-felt need”—can be viewed as means to probe the
shape of the cost curve, and we argue elsewhere that there are other factors
44
that should also be included.
The model also sheds light, for example, on the puzzle of how the “level
of ordinary skill in the art” is connected to the ultimate assessment of
nonobviousness. A naïve approach might conclude that the higher the level
of skill in a particular art, the more obvious new inventions are likely to be.
Such an approach seems to call for a higher nonobviousness threshold in
more skilled fields—thus suggesting, counterintuitively, that the obviousness
threshold should be “higher” in biotechnology than for simple mechanical
inventions. Our model illustrates why such an approach makes no sense.
What matters for nonobviousness is not the level of ordinary skill in one art
compared to the level of ordinary skill in another, but the level of ordinary
skill in a particular art with respect to the technical difficulty of the problems
in that art. The latter determines the rate at which costs increase with
technical difficulty.
Besides drawing our attention to the shape of the cost curve, the model
also informs the analysis of how to perform the ultimate assessment of
obviousness, which should not be viewed as a merely technical assessment,
but must be made in light of an understanding of social spillovers. We turn
to the ramifications of this observation in the next Part of this Article.
IV. OBVIOUSNESS AS A QUESTION OF LAW

It is settled law that the ultimate determination of obviousness is a
question of law with factual underpinnings. As the Supreme Court put it
in its seminal Graham opinion:

42

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740–43 (2007).
44
MEURER AND STRANDBURG, supra note 10. For an earlier discussion of the
importance of taking into account factors such as regulatory and technical change,
see, e.g., Duffy, supra note 4, at 11–14. See also Wagner & Strandburg, supra note 4, at
104.
43
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While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, the §103
condition, which is but one of three conditions, each of which must
be satisfied, lends itself to several basic factual inquiries. Under
§ 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or
nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light
to the circumstance surrounding the origin of the subject matter
45
sought to be patented.
Despite the clear and oft-repeated understanding that obviousness is a
question of law, neither the significance of the legal aspect of the issue, nor
the way in which the factual underpinnings should be related to the ultimate
legal assessment is at all well understood. Indeed, there has been a tendency
to transmute obviousness into an effective question of fact while paying lip
service to its status as a legal issue.
Historically, the status of nonobviousness as a question of fact or law was
disputed. Case law prior to the enactment of the 1952 Act frequently treated
the issue of “invention” (the precursor to modern-day “nonobviousness”) as a
46
question of fact. To this day, the question is frequently decided by a jury—
with or without special interrogatories as to the underlying factual
47
premises. Even more tellingly, the Federal Circuit’s repeated invocations of
the “question of law” mantra in its obviousness jurisprudence were belied by
its actual approach to the obviousness issue. Until the Supreme Court’s
recent rejection of the Federal Circuit’s rigid approach to obviousness, the
Federal Circuit had held that no patent claim could be ruled obvious without
48
an evidentiary, factual finding of a “teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
49
combine” (TSM) prior art references to produce the claimed advance.
Because such a factual finding was a prerequisite of a conclusion that an
invention was obvious, the factual inquiry quite literally swallowed the
potential for “legal” analysis where no such teaching was found since the only
acceptable legal conclusion under those circumstances was that the
45

383 U.S. at 17 –18 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS , § 5.04[3] (2007).
47
See, e.g., Federal Circuit Bar Association Model Patent Jury Instructions
4.3b et seq., available at http://www.memberconnections.com/olc/pub/LVFC/
cpages/misc/purchase_resources.jsp; Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, Model Patent
Jury Instructions § 7.0 (2005), available at http://www.aipla.org/Template.cfm?
ContentID=10448&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm.
48
See, e.g., Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he presence or absence of a motivation to combine references in an obviousness
determination is a pure question of fact[.]” (quoting In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305,
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000))).
49
See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734–35 (describing the
Federal Circuit’s test). In the more unusual case of a single prior art reference, the
Federal Circuit required a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to “modify” it. See, e.g.,
McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
46
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invention was nonobvious. In practice, the TSM test also effectively swallowed
the legal inquiry in cases where there was such a teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine, since a conclusion of nonobviousness in such a case
50
was also extremely rare.
In light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in KSR, which unseated the
Federal Circuit’s rigid requirement of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation
to combine as a prerequisite to a legal conclusion of obviousness and
mandated a return to the Graham framework, the question of what it means
for obviousness to be a question of law is now open and an answer to this
question is urgently needed as part of a re-thinking of the nonobviousness
requirement more generally. To further complicate matters, the doctrine of
obviousness as a question of law was developed before the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Dickinson v. Zurko brought judicial review of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) into the standard administrative law
51
fold. Once the Federal Circuit’s TSM short-circuit of the legal question of
obviousness is abandoned, the Graham framework raises difficult questions
not only about the relationship between the Federal Circuit and the lower
courts, but also about the relationship between the Federal Circuit and the
USPTO with respect to judicial review of obviousness determinations.
Here, we do not attempt to address those potentially thorny
administrative law issues. Rather, we seek to contribute to the development
of nonobviousness doctrine by asking the more fundamental question of why
the nonobviousness determination should be deemed a question of law as a
policy matter. The line between questions of law and questions of fact crops
up in many contexts, of course, and is generally a somewhat perplexing issue
52
to which various approaches are possible. One approach, which we adopt
here, is to treat the question of whether an issue should be treated as a
53
question of law or fact as a practical question of institutional competence.
50
We surveyed Federal Circuit cases between 1995–2006 and found that in 44
out of 45 cases in which a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine was found,
the invention was deemed obvious.
51
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K.
Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn From Administrative Law,
95 GEO. L. J. 269, 270–71 (2007).
52
See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing & Rationalizing the
Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 649 (1988) (standards of
review serve to allocate responsibility between trial tribunals and the courts of
appeals); Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American
Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407 (1999); Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of
Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L. J. 1 (1985); Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up
About Mixed Questions, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101 (2005); Ronald J. Allen & Michael
S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 1769 (2003).
53
As the Supreme Court said in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.
370, 388 (1996):
Where history and precedent provide no clear answers, functional
considerations also play their part in the choice between judge and jury to
define terms of art. We said in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985), that
when an issue ‘falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a
simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a
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We thus frame the question in this way: Who is better suited to make the
determinations required to decide whether a patent should be granted on a
54
particular invention, factfinders or judges? Factfinders are conversant with
the evidence in a particular case and have had the opportunity to hear
witnesses and assess their credibility. Judges, on the other hand, are
conversant with the interpretation of statutory language and are able to take
a broader, policy-based view of the possible ramifications of particular
outcomes in particular cases.
While the line between questions of law and questions of fact is difficult
to draw in many contexts, it may be particularly difficult to draw in the
patent arena because of the importance not only of the kind of case-specific
facts relevant to questions such as negligence and of over-arching policy
issues of the kind common law judges routinely take into account, but also of
highly technical matters which are to be gauged from the perspective of the
PHOSITA.
Thus, we turn here first to the question of whether difficult
technological inquiries are appropriately treated as questions of law or of
fact. Despite their complexity and difficulty, questions of technology are
generally treated as questions of fact in patent law, presumably because of
the lower court’s greater access to expert and documentary evidence and to
the development of technological issues throughout the course of a trial.
Certainly, putting aside the litigation context for a moment, patent
examiners would seem to be better positioned than judges to deal with
technological questions and it would seem reasonable to afford their
technological assessments the kind of deference afforded to agency factual
determinations according to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dickinson v.
55
Zurko.
Many issues in patent law involving the assessment of technological
matters similar to those underlying the obviousness determination are

determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one
judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in
question.’
(internal citations omitted).
54
Here we oversimplify by considering, for the most part, the determination of
validity in the context of a lawsuit where the rules of factfinder and judge are clear
(even though they may be played in some cases by the same district court judge). Of
course, most determinations of obviousness are made by the USPTO, an
administrative agency. Agencies often act in both factfinding and legal capacities. The
PTO’s position is particularly complicated because it does not have substantive
rulemaking capacity. We wish to avoid here the complexities of determining, for
example, what form of deference would be appropriate for the Federal Circuit to give
to a PTO determination of a question of law. We think the higher-level matter of
whether, and in what sense, obviousness is a question of law can be resolved without
getting into these admittedly important questions, simply by analyzing whether the
obviousness inquiry is more appropriately addressed to an actor playing the
factfinding role or an actor playing the legal role. For simplicity, we thus speak of
juries and judges while recognizing that the factfinding and legal evaluation tasks are
both performed in the first instance by a PTO examiner.
55
Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 164.
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treated as factual inquiries. Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,
for example, is a question of fact, despite requiring a determination of
whether a PHOSITA would have deemed an element of an allegedly
56
infringing invention to be interchangeable with a claim limitation. Novelty,
which requires a comparison of a claimed invention to an allegedly
57
infringing embodiment, is also treated as a factual question. The written
58
description requirement is also deemed a question of fact.
Exceptions from this general treatment of technology-based questions as
fact questions provide additional insight. The existence of a statutory bar
59
under section 102(b), for example, is considered a question of law. At first
glance, this is surprising in light of the fact that much of the art available to
challenge validity under 102(b) is of the same ilk as that available under
102(a)’s novelty provision. However, upon further reflection it is clear that
102(b) is the locus of significant policy balancing. To the chagrin of
generations of patent law students (and with not a shred of statutory
justification), 102(b) analysis treats trade secret use of an invention prior to
filing differently depending on whether it is used by the inventor or by a
60
third party. This distinction results in a complicated analysis that reflects a
juggling of various patent law policies involving not removing things from
the public domain, protecting the interests of smaller inventors, and
forestalling gamesmanship aimed at extending effective patent life. The
presence of these policy issues makes it sensible to treat 102(b) as a question
of law.
Enablement, which requires determining whether a PHOSITA would be
enabled to make and use an invention without undue experimentation by
reading the specification, is deemed a question of law by the Federal Circuit,
61
though it was treated as a question of fact by some earlier courts. Like
62
obviousness, it is determined on the basis of underlying questions of fact.
The factual considerations are technical questions akin to those underlying
the obviousness determination:
They include (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the
amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or
absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5)
the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7)
56
See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
57
See, e.g., Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 requires the disclosure in a single piece
of prior art of each and every limitation of a claimed invention. Whether such art is
anticipating is a question of fact.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
58
3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 7.04[f] (2007).
59
See, e.g., Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
60
Compare, e.g., Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153
F.2d 516, 520 (2d. Cir. 1946) with W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc. 721 F.2d
1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
61
See CHISUM, supra note 58, at § 7.03[b][i] for a discussion of the history of the
treatment of enablement as a question of law.
62
See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth
63
of the claims.
The ultimate question of enablement is a policy assessment of whether
the disclosure is sufficient to warrant the quid pro quo of a patent or
whether the PHOSITA must engage in “undue experimentation.” The
amount of experimentation required is thus a technical question which is
determined by factfinders, but it is a policy matter whether the
experimentation required is “undue.”
Claim construction might seem like an exception to the general
64
treatment of technological questions as questions of fact. However, it is
treated as a question of law not because of its technical complexity but
because of presumed judicial expertise in construing written documents,
despite its involving technical understanding of those documents. In holding
in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. that claim construction is a question
for the judge, the Supreme Court did not delve into the question of who is
better situated to deal with complicated technology, resting its decision on
the judge’s generally superior ability to construe documents and on the need
65
for uniformity in claim construction determinations. However, the Federal
Circuit’s later interpretation of the Markman ruling as authorizing de novo
66
review of claim construction rulings has been extremely controversial, even
67
among Federal Circuit judges. Critics of the Federal Circuit’s current
position argue that district judges who have heard the evidence and expert
testimony on the technical questions underlying claim construction are
better positioned to make the underlying technological determinations
relevant to claim construction and should be afforded deference as to those
underlying issues.
In most instances, then, courts have come to the conclusion that
factfinders, who have the opportunity to hear extensive testimony, often by
experts, and to peruse relevant technical references, are more competent
than appellate judges at coming to grips with the technological aspects of
patent law. The treatment of inquiries into the state of technology as
questions of fact is reflected in the Supreme Court’s framework for the
obviousness inquiry, which treats “the scope and content of the prior art,”
63

Id.
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (claim
construction is a question for the judge; there is no right to a jury determination);
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (claim
construction is reviewed by the Federal Circuit de novo).
65
Markman, 517 U.S. at 388–91.
66
Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1451.
67
See, e.g., Id. at 1463 (Bryson, J. , concurring); Id. at 1463–66 (Mayer, J.,
concurring); Id. at 1473–81 (Rader, J., dissenting in part); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
F.3d 1303, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer, J. dissenting) (arguing that,
under the Cybor de novo review standard, “with a blind eye to the consequences, we
continue to struggle under this irrational and reckless regime, trying every
alternative—dictionaries first, dictionaries second, never dictionaries, etc., etc., etc.”
and that “there can be no workable standards by which this court will interpret claims
so long as we are blind to the factual component of the task.”).
64
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“differences between the claimed invention and the prior art” and “the level
of skill in the art” as factual questions.
If factfinders are considered most competent to determine technical
questions, then in what sense is obviousness a question of law? Here our
model provides important insight. Previous treatment of the nonobviousness
requirement has obscured the non-technological policy questions it involves.
In one view, the assessment of nonobviousness is almost exclusively
technological. This view, which we might call the technical view of
nonobviousness, seems to underlie the Federal Circuit’s TSM test. In this
view, the aim of the nonobviousness inquiry is solely to determine whether,
at the time of the invention, if one had presented a representative sample of
persons having ordinary skill in the art with the problem addressed by the
invention and asked them, “How would you solve this question?”, some
reasonable proportion of them would have responded by describing the
68
claimed invention. There are practical difficulties, most notably the
69
hindsight bias, in getting the right answer to this question in retrospect, but
on this view of nonobviousness, there is only a technical question to be
answered.
The technical view of nonobviousness gives us no particular reason to
treat obviousness as a question of law. Cases such as Markman also do not
justify treating obviousness as a question of law. The underpinnings of the
determination that claim construction is a question of law despite its
technical content do not really apply to the nonobviousness determination.
Obviousness assessment does not revolve around the interpretation of legal
documents, nor is there the strong interest in uniformity that exists in claim
construction. Once a claim is rejected by the patent office and the rejection
affirmed on appeal, it is no longer going to be assessed (uniformly or
otherwise) by any other tribunal. Moreover, invalidity determinations in
litigation are subject to collateral estoppel, so they are also unlikely to be
70
presented to more than one court. It is thus not surprising that those
holding the technical view of nonobviousness would inevitably slide toward
treating nonobviousness as a question of fact, even if giving lip service to the
Supreme Court’s requirement that nonobviousness be treated as a question
of law.
A second view, popular among commentators, which we might call the
contextual view of nonobviousness, is that the normative goal of the
nonobviousness doctrine is to refrain from patenting anything that would be
71
invented without a patent incentive. Implicit in this view is the assumption,
discussed in more detail in Part V, that patenting a particular invention
decreases its social value, so that if it would be invented (or perhaps invented
68

This view is reflected in the experiments reported by Mandel, Patently NonObvious and Patent Non-Obvious II, supra note 4.
69
Id.
70
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 316–19
(1971).
71
See, e.g., Merges, Uncertainty, supra note 4; Kitch, supra note 4; Duffy, supra note
4; Wagner & Strandburg, supra note 4.
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and disclosed) without a patent incentive, patenting it should be avoided.
This view moves beyond the technical view, in which nonobviousness could
be assessed in principle simply by polling persons having ordinary skill in the
art. To determine whether a particular invention exceeds what one of us has
72
called the “competitive baseline” requires an understanding not only of the
technology at issue, but also of the social and economic context in which it
and similar technology is developed. Understanding this context requires
delving into both technical and economic questions that are not raised by
the purely technical view. For example, one must account for the problemsolving methodology and tools available to the PHOSITA as well as for the
PHOSITA’s ordinary creativity in order to predict where competition alone
would take innovation. Information about “the effects of demands known to
73
the design community or present in the marketplace” is needed to assess
whether a claimed invention goes beyond the innovation that would have
been inspired by the marketplace without a need for patent protection.
The Supreme Court in KSR clearly endorses the contextual view of
nonobviousness when it says, “Granting patent protection to advances that
would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation retards progress
and may, in the case of patents combining previously known elements,
74
deprive prior inventions of their value or utility.” Its treatment of the
“obvious to try” doctrine seems similarly inspired by the contextual view.
There the Court observes,
[w]hen there is a design need or market pressure to solve a
problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the
known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the
anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of
75
ordinary skill and common sense.
The contextual view adopted in KSR expands the scope of factual
questions relevant to determining obviousness, suggesting more robust
interpretations of Graham’s factors, such as the level of skill in the art, and
secondary considerations, such as long-felt need. It may also suggest
additional factual inquiries that are relevant to determining to what extent
an invention exceeds the competitive baseline, such as whether there have
been collateral technological advances, regulatory changes, or shifts in
demand that have affected either the cost side or the benefit side of the
76
invention context. In our longer article, we discuss some of these issues as
they relate to our model and suggest doctrinal modifications to take this
broader view of nonobviousness into account.
While the contextual view of nonobviousness broadens the scope of
factual underpinnings of nonobviousness, does it compel us to treat

72
73
74
75
76

Wagner & Strandburg, supra note 4.
KSR Int’l Corp. v. Teleflex Inc.,, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740 (2007).
Id. at 1741.
Id. at 1742.
See, e.g., Wagner & Strandburg, supra note 4; Duffy, supra note 4.
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obviousness as a question of law? Certainly it moves us in that direction
because it requires not only an assessment of the current state of technology
but a counterfactual prediction of what would happen (or would have
happened when the issue arises in litigation) if a patent were not available
for a particular technology. Moreover, while a purely technical PTO may be
better equipped than a district court to assess the technical underpinnings of
nonobviousness, it may be even less well equipped than a district court to
confront the economic issues implicated by the contextual treatment of
nonobviousness, thus suggesting that a court may be better equipped to
77
make the ultimate nonobviousness determination. Our model is consistent
with the contextual view, in that it suggests that we should consider
everything (including shifts in demand, changes in the tools available to
inventors, changes in non-patent appropriation mechanisms, and advances
in collateral technologies) that affects the ex ante expected costs and benefits
to inventors and thus affects their likely choices of research directions.
Our model provides an additional, and not previously appreciated,
reason to treat the ultimate assessment of nonobviousness as a question of
law, however. In our model, the appropriate placement of the
nonobviousness threshold depends on an assessment of the degree to which
a particular sort of research produces social welfare spillovers. It also requires
an assessment as to whether the patenting constraint precludes the use of the
patent system to promote socially optimal research. The more that social
benefit exceeds the private benefit to the patentee, the more likely it is that a
privately optimal choice of research project will be substantially less
ambitious than the socially preferred project. The choice of nonobviousness
threshold to prod potential inventors toward more difficult, socially
preferable research projects depends on a normative assessment of the value
of social spillovers that seems highly appropriate for judicial resolution, as
opposed to determination by a factfinder or even an expert agency.
Both the Supreme Court’s KSR interpretation of the Graham obviousness
framework in light of the competitive baseline and our model’s implication
that the nonobviousness threshold should be keyed to social spillovers may
be used to give practical meaning and content to the way in which the
nonobviousness determination requires legal analysis over and above the
78
determination of relevant underlying technical and economic facts. Both
also indicate what questions the legal analysis should be aimed at answering.
This kind of structured interpretation of obviousness as a question of law is
important both to obtain the best results from a social perspective and to
77

This assessment of institutional competency is highly dependent on the
current structure of the PTO as a purely technical agency. One could imagine that an
expert patent agency, with the appropriate economic expertise to conduct the
assessment of what would have been likely without the patent incentive, could make
such assessments better than a court would be able to do.
78
See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 4, at 385–86 for a discussion of the difficulties
that arise when there is no underlying rationale for the ultimate determination of
obviousness. For an argument that obviousness should not be treated as a question of
law see, Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realist Approach to the Obviousness of
Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2008).
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respond to the criticism that the demise (or at least demotion) of the TSM
test leaves us with an arbitrary “because it looks that way to the judge or
79
examiner” doctrine.
V. WHEN A NONOBVIOUSNESS THRESHOLD IS NOT ENOUGH:
INSIGHTS INTO THE FUNCTION OF CATEGORICAL PATENTABLE
SUBJECT MATTER EXCLUSIONS
Up until now, we have assumed in our model that the social value of an
invention, W(y), is the same whether or not the invention is patented. In
reality, of course, a patent changes the social value of an invention, as the
discussions of the tradeoffs involved in patent protection common in both
80
case law and scholarly commentary recognize. Indeed these tradeoffs drive
much of patent doctrine. Not surprisingly, they have implications for our
model of nonobviousness as well.

Figure 5
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See, e.g., Wagner & Strandburg, supra note 4, for a discussion of problems
caused by an insufficiently structured obviousness doctrine.
80
See, e.g., Merges, Uncertainty, supra note 4; KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1746; Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1966) (describing the underlying policy of the
patent system that “‘the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of
an exclusive patent,’ as Jefferson put it, must outweigh the restrictive effect of the
limited patent monopoly. The inherent problem was to develop some means of
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Figure 5 thus further complicates our story and moves us closer to
reality by allowing the social value of a research project to depend on
whether or not the inventive entity expects to get a patent. In particular, we
assume in Figure 5 that a patent imposes a net social cost and that expected
social value is lower if the invention is patented than if it is not. Thus, in
Figure 5, for any choice of project difficulty y, W(y) < w(y), where w(y) is
expected social value without a patent, and W(y) is expected social value with
a patent. A patent potentially reduces the social value of a given invention
because patent owners restrict diffusion of patented inventions, because
patents discourage cumulative innovation, and because of the burden of
patent litigation costs. It is important to emphasize that w(y) and W(y)
represent the social value conferred by research project y, assuming it is
undertaken. To assume that w(y) > W(y) is not to assume that the patent system
imposes a net social cost, but merely to make the much less debatable
assumption that for any given research project patenting imposes net social
costs. A primary purpose of the patent system is to induce prospective
inventors to move to higher levels (and thus presumably more socially
valuable levels) of invention. The net effect of the patent system is a tradeoff
of this higher level of invention against the social costs of patenting which
may well lead to net social benefits overall.
If patenting an invention decreases its social value, there are at least two
important consequences. First, the social cost of patenting generally leads to
another role for the nonobviousness threshold in addition to its role as a
“stick” for inducing potential inventors to take on more difficult projects.
This additional role is familiar from previous case law and commentary.
Where patenting imposes social costs, a nonobviousness threshold ensures
that patents are not obtained for the inventions created by pursuing research
projects like yn, since that project would be pursued even in the absence of
patenting and its social value is decreased if it is patented.
Besides this well-appreciated implication of the social costs of patenting,
allowing expected social value to differ depending on the presence of a
patent shows that the extent to which the nonobviousness threshold stick can
be used to encourage socially optimal research is limited. This is because
when w(y) > W(y), there is a second constraint on the welfare problem of
choosing the socially optimal research project. We will call it the social cost
constraint. The social cost constraint implies that optimal patent policy blocks
patenting entirely—rather than using patenting to induce more difficult
projects—when the social costs of a patent are too high. Simply put, a less
difficult project that cannot be patented may be socially preferred to the
most preferable optimal project that can be induced by the prospect of a
patent because the patent would create unacceptable social cost.
Figure 5 illustrates the social cost constraint. Because patenting reduces
the expected social value of the research projects in this example by a large
amount, even the optimal patented project is not as socially valuable as the
optimal non-patented project. The net expected social value at yn is w(yn) –
weeding out those inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the
inducement of a patent.”)
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c(yn), shown in the diagram as AC. The net expected social value at the
optimal nonobviousness threshold, O, is W(O) – c(O), shown in the diagram
as DF. Since AC is greater than DF, the socially optimal choice is yn even
though the private value is greater at O. Despite the fact that the prospect of
a patent induces greater technological progress, it would be socially
preferable in this case to discourage patenting and avoid the associated
social costs.
Figure 5 also helps us to understand why a fairly robust nonobviousness
standard may be a preferable tool for inducing greater levels of technical
advance than doctrinal changes, such as increased patent term or patent
scope, that increase the extent to which patentees can appropriate the social
value associated with their research projects. As patent strength is increased,
causing V(y) to increase toward W(y) in Figure 5, it also seems plausible that
the social costs of patenting increase, causing W(y) to decline toward V(y). As
this happens, it becomes more and more likely that the social value of the
optimal patented invention is less than that of the optimal unpatented
invention. Patenting is, therefore, less likely to be able to produce social
gain.
The observation that patenting may be socially undesirable in some
scenarios even if it induces researchers to undertake more technically
difficult projects is of relevance to the debate over patentable subject matter
limitations. Patentable subject matter limitations, such as the bans on
patenting of scientific discoveries and abstract ideas, are motivated explicitly
by concerns about the high social costs of patent exclusivity for certain
81
categories of inventions. A common response to those concerns is that
these social costs are simply a necessary price of further advances. Moreover,
it is frequently argued that we can achieve our social goal of “promoting
progress in science and the Useful Arts” by taking a very expansive, virtually
unlimited view of patentable subject matter and then restraining
unwarranted patenting using the other tools of patentability analysis,
including, importantly, the nonobviousness requirement and limitations on
82
patent scope.
Our model suggests that the nonobviousness requirement and
patentable subject matter restrictions may be playing two separate, and
important, roles in regulating incentives for research and thereby illustrates
why the two doctrines are not simply interchangeable. The purpose of the
nonobviousness requirement, besides preventing inventors from patenting
inventions that do not require a patent incentive, is to push inventors to
undertake more difficult research than they would choose if simply
optimizing their private benefit. Nonobviousness doctrine should be tuned
to locate the nonobviousness threshold as near as possible to the socially
optimal level of research difficulty in the presence of patenting. It should
81
See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589–93 (1978); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56
U.S. 62, 113 (1854). See also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126
S. Ct. 2921, 2922–23 (2006) (Per Curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (dismissing of grant
of certiorari as improvidently granted).
82
See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 9.
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thus be sensitive to the costs of research and to the extent to which particular
research directions are likely to produce socially beneficial spillovers.
Our model suggests an entirely different and complementary role for
patentable subject matter doctrine. Patentable subject matter doctrine
should be used to identify those types of subject matter for which the social
costs of patent protection are so high that the increased inventive steps that
can be induced by offering a patent are simply not worth the costs imposed
by patenting. Thus, as an example, while offering patents for the discovery of
new laws of nature might well induce private investors to fund more difficult
research projects, the social cost of giving one entity control over
applications of that law of nature may simply be too great to be offset by the
increased investment in science that the possibility of a patent attracts.
Our justification of patentable subject matter restrictions depends on the
assumption that patenting introduces net social costs for a given invention,
i.e., w(y) > W(y). This assumption is ubiquitous in discussions of patent law; it
underlies the traditional discussions of patentable subject matter and also
the traditional assumption that a nonobviousness threshold is desirable to
avoid patenting advances that would occur without the patent incentive. In
some cases, however, patents may raise social value compared to the nopatent case. Exclusivity always has social costs which must be incorporated
into W(y), as discussed above. Nonetheless, there are two kinds of situations
in which we could imagine that patenting a particular invention might result
in higher net social value than not patenting it. Theoretically, this would be
the case if patenting an invention results in less social cost attributable to
exclusivity. This situation could arise if trade secrecy were an option and if
the trade secrecy period were longer than the patent term. Patenting such an
invention would result in less exclusivity. If this is the case, however, it seems
likely that the private value of trade secrecy will exceed that of patenting and
thus the potential social benefits of patenting will not be realized. Another
way in which patenting could lead to less social cost due to exclusivity would
be a situation in which non-patent private value is maximized by trade secret
use of an invention, such as an industrial process, but an inventor who gets a
patent chooses to license the invention rather than use it exclusively. In such
a situation, social value could be higher with a patent available than without.
The other reason that an invention might be worth more to society
patented than unpatented is that the patent disclosure might be valuable
enough to offset the social losses due to the greater exclusivity afforded by
83
patent protection. This may be the case for particular inventions, but it is
certainly not generally expected to be the case. The social value of patent
disclosure is not the entire social value of disclosure of the invention but only
the value attributable to the fact that the patent disclosure comes earlier
than the disclosure inherent in reverse engineering or independent
invention, and is perhaps of greater value as a result of the enablement and
written description requirements.
83
We assume here again that if trade secrecy actually provides greater exclusivity,
inventors will prefer trade secrecy regardless of patent policy, so that such cases are
irrelevant to our analysis.
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The cases in which patenting an invention might increase its social value
are therefore those in which trade secrecy is an option, inventors would
choose patenting over trade secrecy, and the social tradeoff favors a longer
period of patent exclusivity over a shorter period of trade secrecy protection.
We suspect such cases are relatively rare, but they are interesting here for two
reasons. First, it seems clear that patentable subject matter restrictions
should not apply to such cases. Second, it is interesting to note that the
traditional justifications for a nonobviousness threshold have no force if
patenting produces positive social benefits for a given invention. However,
the function of nonobviousness as a “stick” to induce socially beneficial levels
of research survives even if patenting increases the social value of research
projects aimed at some objective.
To summarize, our model suggests that there may be categories of
invention for which the social costs of patenting are such as to justify a
patentable subject matter exclusion even if the result of such an exclusion is
a smaller inventive step and that those categories of invention are
characterized by large social spillovers and high social costs of patenting.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in KSR provides an opportunity for new
and more detailed theoretical inquiry into the optimal design of an inventive
step requirement. The model we present here is an initial foray in that
direction. The version of the model presented here contains a number of
simplifications, of course. Two important simplifications are that we consider
only a single research entity pursuing a single research project and that we
treat the projects arrayed along the y axis as independent and nonoverlapping both technologically and in terms of eventual patent rights. We
defer more detailed treatment of the model and its doctrinal implications to
our longer article, where we address these limitations. Even from the simple
model presented here, however, we gain insight into the possible reasons for
having a nonobviousness threshold, the policy questions that underlie the
treatment of obviousness as a question of law, and the distinct functions of
nonobviousness and patentable subject matter doctrine.

